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During their Administration and throughout the 1992 Presidential campaign,
President Bush and Vice President Quayle claimed that the welfare initiatives
of the 1960's are responsible for the persistence of poverty in the United States
and the urban problems demonstrated so graphically by the Los Angeles riots
this spring.' Their statements are part of a disturbing effort to divert attention
from the structural problems of our society and to focus instead on the so-called
deviance of the poor. The rhetoric of the current "welfare reform"'2 debate goes
something like this: Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) recipients
are themselves responsible for their poverty because they have not "pulled
themselves up by their bootstraps"; they are dysfunctional mothers incapable
of fitting into mainstream society, and they are economically and emotionally
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1. Michael Wines, White House Links Riots to Welfare, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1992, at Al; Seth Sutel,
Quayle: Welfare to Blame, BOSTON GLOBE, May 14, 1992, at 13. The rioting in South Central Los Angeles
was in response to the acquittal of the white police officers who had been videotaped beating an African-
American suspect, Rodney King.
2. I put the term "welfare reform" in quotation marks because, in my opinion, the most recent state
initiatives are designed not to solve the multiple problems faced by poor women and children or to improve
the economic conditions for such families, but rather to penalize them for their actions and to reduce welfare
rolls.
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atrophied because of their "dependence"3 on welfare. Proponents of "welfare
reform" further argue that by withholding AFDC benefits, the government can
transform present recipients into productive members of society, thereby solving
the intractable problems of poverty. Consistent with this rhetoric, the current
"welfare reform" proposals condition AFDC eligibility on conformity with
putative moral norms of society. Underlying the proposals is the belief that the
receipt of assistance is debilitating.4
These concepts, always an undercurrent in American history, surfaced with
new vigor in the work of conservative scholars in the early 1980's.5 The
conservatives' ideas engendered several state demonstration projects, including
Learnfare (loss of benefits if a child misses a certain number of days of school
or fails to average a certain grade),6 Family Cap (loss of benefits for additional
children),7 Bridefare or Wedfare (small monetary incentives given to a mother
to marry the father of her child combined with the loss of benefits for additional
children),8 incentives for recipients to use Norplant contraception, 9 and benefit
reductions if the mother pays her rent irregularly or fails to obtain medical
treatment for her children.1° The idea behind all of these projects is the same:
3. The "dependency" concept has always played a role in the cash assistance debate, but has undergone
substantial transformation. Compare Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 785 (1964)
(arguing that welfare benefits are designed to "preserve the self-sufficiency of the individual") with LAWRENCE
N. MEAD, BEYOND ENTITLEMENT: THE SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS OF CrIZENSHIP 41 (1986) (accusing welfare
state of undermining discipline and creating great reliance on government).
4. The current welfare debate catapulted to front-page news when President Bush endorsed Wisconsin's
Family Cap demonstration project, which denies additional AFDC benefits to children born into an AFDC
family, and adopted it as part of his "welfare reform" initiative. See Michael Kranish, Bush Backs
Experimental Welfare Plan, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 11, 1992, at 1; Andrew Rosenthal, Bush Backs Wisconsin
Attempt at Welfare Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1992, at D20.
5. See, e.g., GEORGE GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY (1981); CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND
(1984).
6. Learnfare operates in Wisconsin, Ohio, Maryland, and in modified form in Virginia. It was proposed
during the 1992 state legislative sessions in Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
and Washington. JODIE LEVIN-EPsTEN & MARK GREENBERG, CENTER FOR LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY, 1992
STATE AFDC LEGISLATIVE AND WAIVER ACTIONS (1992).
7. Family Cap operates in New Jersey and has been proposed during 1992 legislative sessions in Arizona,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Virginia, and Washington. Id. Wisconsin
has received a federal waiver to establish a Family Cap program, although the state legislature has not yet
authorized one. See infra notes 109-110 and accompanying text.
8. Bridefare was proposed in Mississippi and Wrsconsin. Jodie Levin-Epstein, A Report on State Welfare
Developments, CLASP STATES NETWORK UPDATE, (Center for Law and Social Policy, Washington, D.C.),
Mar. 20, 1992, at 8, 13 [hereinafter CLASP UPDATE].
9. Incentives for welfare mothers to use Norplant have been proposed in Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi,
South Carolina, and Tennessee. Id.; Tamar Lewin, A Plan to Pay Welfare Mothers for Birth Control, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 9, 1991, at A9.
10. In January 1993, Maryland will implement a $25 per month AFDC reduction for each preschool-age
child not getting preventive health care. Jodie Levin-Epstein, HHS Approved Waivers, FAMILY MATTERS,
(Center for Law and Social Policy, Washington, D.C.), July 1992, at 13-14. Maryland has also proposed
a 30% reduction for mothers who do not regularly pay their rent. Rogers Worthington, The State as Stern
Parent, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 17, 1992, at 3.
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only those women and children who conform to majoritarian middle-class values
deserve government subsistence benefits.
Because projects that condition eligibility on behavior contravene the
mandated eligibility requirements set forth in the Social Security Act," they
require the United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to
waive the entitlement provisions under 42 U.S.C. § 1315. Through this
administrative mechanism, President Bush embraced the use of welfare laws
to attempt to modify behavior.
This Essay analyzes two of the most popular behavior-modification models
of "welfare reform" and places them in historical context. Part I reviews the
historical discrimination against women and people of color in our cash
assistance programs and discusses the persistent national ambivalence about
welfare. Parts II and III critique the effectiveness of the Learnfare and Family
Cap proposals respectively, by reviewing their stated goals and demonstrating
the empirical inaccuracies of their underlying assumptions. Part IV argues that
these "reform" efforts are driven by a New Right agenda, an "ideology of
division" that has manipulated public opinion by highlighting racial and gender
biases.
I. BEING TRUE TO OUR ROOTS: THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT FOR
BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION PROPOSALS
The United States has always been ambivalent about assisting the poor,
unsure whether the poor are good people facing difficult times and circumstances
or bad people who cannot fit into society.12 In this Part, I discuss how certain
groups, defined primarily by race and gender, have been excluded, included,
and once again excluded from public welfare programs.
Public welfare programs in the United States originated as discretionary
programs for the "worthy" poor. Local asylums or poorhouses separated the
deserving poor, such as the blind, deaf, insane, and eventually the orphaned,
from the undeserving, comprising all other paupers including children in families,
with wide variation and broad local administrative discretion.' 3 Even for the
deserving poor, state initiatives before 1929 were usually permissive and were
frequently underfunded. 4
11. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10)(A) (1989) ("[Alid to families with dependent children shall.., be furnished
with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals."). This provision prohibits the states from varying
the categorical eligibility requirements established by the Social Security Act. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309,
333 (1968).
12. MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR 9-10 (1989).
13. EDWARD BERKOWITz & KIM MCQUAID, CREATING THE WELFARE STATE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF TWENTIETH-CENTURY REFORM 26 (1980); Joel F. Handler, The Transformation Of Aid To Families With
Dependent Children: The Family Support Act in Historical Context, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANOE
457, 470-72 (1987-88).
14. FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC
WELFARE 48 (1971). Particularly noteworthy is that 82% of participants in these programs were widows,
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The Great Depression provided the impetus for a national framework to
provide assistance to the poor. s Local governmental entities were staggering
under the costs of relief.1 6 In addition, the massive unemployment of previously
employed, white male voters made it politically impossible to dismiss the poor
as responsible for their own situation.
1 7
With the passage of the Federal Emergency Relief Act of 1933, the federal
government assumed responsibility and appropriated funds to provide cash relief
through a program for all needy unemployed persons and their dependents, not
just the worthy widows and orphans.1 s But legislators considered cash relief
a temporary measure to last only until the Depression ended. Consistent with
the view that welfare undermines the value systems of its recipients, 20 legis-
lators believed that cash relief was emotionally debilitating, while work, in
contrast, fostered dignity.2' Thus the Social Security Act of 1935 was a limited
statute, targeted to specific populations in the form of three programs: unemploy-
ment insurance, old-age insurance, and federal aid to states that chose to provide
cash relief to certain unemployables (the old, the blind, and the orphaned).22
Earlier, broader proposals covering all children in need-not just those without
a parent-were rejected. 23
From its inception, the language and administration of the Social Security
Act ("the Act") allowed the exclusion of African Americans from the programs.
For example, Southern Congressmen defeated statutory language that would
have protected African Americans from discrimination in eligibility for old-age
pensions. 24 Impelled by their fear that elderly African Americans would help
and 96% were white. Of the 3% who were African American, half lived in just two states. The programs
included continuous supervision of families to ensure their worthiness. WINIFRED BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT
CHILDREN 9-13 (1965).
15. MIMI ABRAMOVrTz, REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN: SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY FROM COLONIAL
TIES TO THE PRESENT 226-27 (1989). The significance of the cash assistance programs enacted during
the New Deal is debatable. Primary enforcement of the programs was still a local responsibility; however,
federal financial participation was established for the first time. Handler, supra note 13, at 479.
16. PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 14, at 66-67.
17. MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE 211-12 (1986). Piven and Cloward
juxtapose this assistance of unemployed white men to the lack of response from local relief agencies to the
millions of African Americans who were displaced from the rural South by agricultural modernization in
the 1950's, but who were without the political power to compel a response. PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note
14, at 57.
18. Federal Emergency Relief Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-15, ch. 30, § 4(a), 48 Stat. 57.
19. BERKOWITZ & MCQUAID, supra note 13, at 138.
20. See William H. Simon, The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 MD. L. REV. 1, 11
n.34 (1985) (collecting sources).
21. Even in 1935, the year the Social Security Act was passed, President Roosevelt stated that
"[clontinued dependence upon relief induces a spiritual and moral disintegration fundamentally destructive
to the national fibre .... "3 ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE POLITICS OF
UPHEAVAL 267 (1960).
22. The result of this selection of programs was a classic continuation of the dichotomy between
deserving and undeserving poor:, those whose benefits were tied to attachment to the labor force were the
deserving, and those who had not worked were the undeserving. KATZ, supra note 17, at 238-39.
23. BELL, supra note 14, at 27.
24. The words mandating that relief could not be denied to any citizen if qualifications regarding age
and need were met, thereby providing some protection to African Americans, were changed to provide only
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support younger African Americans, who would thus become less pliant field
laborers, these same Congressmen eliminated specific language requiring that
old-age benefits be "a reasonable subsistence compatible with decency and
health," 2 thereby retaining state discretion over the amount of benefits.26
African-American leaders had argued that local standards would allow "less
assistance to aged Negroes than to aged whites."27
The small program that covered children living with their mothers, s Aid
to Dependent Children (ADC), assisted the children of women who were white,
widowed, and had been connected to men for a substantial portion of their
lives.29 Given that population, policymakers considered ADC a temporary
program, effective until dependents could be covered under the portion of the
Act dealing with male workers' old-age insurance.30 Although society had
ambivalent feelings about supporting this population, 31 it was willing to do
so because the job of these white women was to provide good homes for their
children.32
The legislative history of the Social Security Act allowed the states, which
administered the ADC program, to condition eligibility upon the sexual morality
of ADC mothers through suitable-home or "man-in-the-house" rules.33 In some
that length of citizenship could not be used to exclude applicants. This allowed the exclusion of African
Americans on grounds other than citizenship. PAUL H. DOUGLAS, SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE UNITED STATES:
AN ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL OF THE FEDERAL SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 87, 101 (1939).
25. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 74TH CONG., IST SESS., SOCIAL SECURITY BILL: SUMMARY
OF PROVISIONS, COMPARISON OFTEXT OF ORIGINAL BILL, AND WAYS AND MEANS REDRAFT, COMPILATION
OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, ETC. 3 (Comm. Print 1935) (reviewing statutory language deleted by House
Ways and Means Committee).
26. Jill S. Quadagno, Welfare Capitalism and the Social Security Act of 1935,49 AM. Soc. REV. 632,
643 (1984).
27. Economic Security Act: Hearings on S. 1130 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 489 (1935) (statement of George E. Haynes, Executive Secretary, Department of Race Relations,
Federal Council of Churches).
28. Mothers themselves were not covered by the program until 1950. Social Security Act Amendments
of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-734, § 323, 64 Star. 477, 551 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 606 (1989)).
29. ABRAMOVrrz, supra note 15, at 318-19; DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, THE POLITICS OF A GUARANTEED
ANNUAL INCOME 43-44 (1973).
30. BERKOWITZ & MCQUAID, supra note 13, at 138.
31. Handler, supra note 13, at 487.
32. SHEILA M. ROTHMAN, WOMAN'S PROPER PLACE 221-24 (1978). Legislators viewed ADC as
"designed to release from the wage-earning role the person whose natural function is to give her children
the physical and affectionate guardianship necessary, not alone to keep them from falling into social
misfortune, but more affirmatively to rear them into citizens capable of contributing to society." Economic
Security Act: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means on H.R. 4120, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
48 (1935).
33. H.R. REP. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1935); S. REP. NO. 628, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. 36
(1935) ("[The State] may, furthermore, impose such other eligibility requirements-as to means, moral
character, etc.-as it sees fit.")
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states,34 African-American single mothers were intentionally excluded from
the welfare rolls. 5 One Southern field supervisor reported:
The number of Negro cases is few due to the unanimous feeling on
the part of the staff and board that there are more work opportunities
for Negro women and to their intense desire not to interfere with local
labor conditions. The attitude that "they have always gotten along,"
and that "all they'll do is have more children" is definite .... There
is hesitancy on the part of lay boards to advance too rapidly over the
thinking of their own communities, which see no reason why the
employable Negro mother should not continue her usually sketchy
seasonal labor or indefinite domestic service rather than receive a public
assistance grant.
36
Contrary to the belief of the Social Security Act's drafters, the ADC program
did not decline and disappear. Rather, the civil rights and welfare rights
movements of the 1960's and 1970's resulted in the inclusion of many who had
been excluded from the original ADC program.37 The pivotal scholarship of
Professor Charles Reich in the 1960's set the stage for the concept of welfare
as an entitlement to meet the enduring problem of poverty.38 Aggressive
lawyering on behalf of poor people removed many of the systemic administrative
barriers used to keep African-American women off the welfare rolls. 39 As a
34. Alabama denied AFDC payments to the children of any mother cohabitating in or outside her home
with a single or married able-bodied man; in Louisiana, any home in which an illegitimate child was born
subsequent to the receipt of public assistance was considered unsuitable, and the children in that home were
denied benefits. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 311, 322 (1962). The use of these behavioral rules to keep
African Americans and children of unwed mothers off the welfare rolls is well documented. See ABRAMOVITZ,
supra note 15, at 318-19, 323-27; KATZ, supra note 12, at 253; PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 14, at 138-45;
Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245,
1246-51 (1965); Charles A. Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches and the Social Security Act, 72 YALE L.J.
1347 (1963).
35. BELL, supra note 14, at 34-35.
36. Id. (quoting Mary S. Larabee, UnmarriedParenthood Under the Social Security Act, in PROCEEDINGS
OF THE NAT'L CONFERENCE OF SOCIAL WORK (1939)).
37. KATZ, supra note 12, at 267. Throughout the 1960's, scholars debated about the existence of a
"culture of poverty," which allegedly produced intergenerational poverty perpetuated by a set of values that
were different than those held by the rest of society. Id., at 16-43. Proponents of the idea ranged from blaming
the victims for their cultural deviance to arguing that the culture of poverty resulted from "a long history
of massive deprivations and barriers." Mary Corcoran et al., Myth and Reality: The Causes and Persistence
of Poverty, 4 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 516, 521 (1985).
38. Reich, supra note 3. By the late 1960's, most social scientists endorsed the new policy goal of a
negative income tax or a minimum standard of living for everyone. Most proposals to achieve this goal would
have based eligibility solely on income level, thereby removing the stigmatizing rules previously in place.
President Nixon proposed a form of this concept in the 1969 Family Assistance Plan. Opposed both by
conservatives (who wanted work to be more integral to benefits) and liberals (who thought the benefit level
was too low and the plan too punitive), it was not enacted. DAVID ELLWOOD, POOR SUPPORT: POVERTY
IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY 37 (1988). For a detailed account of this period, see generally MOYNIHAN, supra
note 29.
39. JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, THE MORAL CONSTRUCTION OF POVERTY: WELFARE
REFORM IN AMERICA 117-18 (1991). The states' power to legislate morality through the categorical and
financial eligibility requirements of the AFDC program was curtailed in Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552(1970)
(invalidating regulation allocating to mother for purposes of AFDC income of man who shares her home
[Vol. 102: 719
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result the number of African Americans on the AFDC 40 rolls increased
dramatically, by approximately 15% between 1965 to 1971 .4 By 1971, only
4.3% of AFDC recipients were widows 2
The early 1980's, however, saw a return to the exclusion of the "undeserving
poor," now defined as those whose behavior did not adhere to middle-class
values. The influential books of New Right scholars George Gilder and Charles
Murray echoed the time-worn thesis that the receipt of public assistance creates
immorality and dependence, undermines values, and increases poverty.43 In
addition, Murray popularized the idea that poor people are motivated primarily
by economic incentives. 4 These ideas form the basis for the current "welfare
reform" proposals. Based on individually tailored state demonstration projects
supported by Bush Administration Social Security Act waivers, these proposals
return to state and local governments the discretion to define who among the
poor are sufficiently worthy to receive benefits.45 In the succeeding two Parts,
I discuss two of the most significant proposals, Learnfare and the Family Cap.
with no legal obligation of support) and King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (holding unconstitutional
Alabama's disqualification from AFDC any mother cohabiting with man who was not obligated to provide
support). However, specified behavior designed to effectuate a public good, such as family planning, was
a sufficiently rational reason to defeat an equal protection challenge to state discretion in determining the
amount of benefits. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (upholding cap on AFDC benefits for
large families, regardless of financial need).
40. The name of the program was changed to Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) in
1962. Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, § 104(a)(3), 76 Stat. 172.
41. IR\VIN GARFINKEL & SARA S. MCLANAHAN, SINGLE MOTHERS AND THEIR CHILDREN: A NEW
AMERICAN DILEMMA 55-57 (1986).
42. MILDRED REIN, DILEMMAS OF WELFARE POLICY: WHY WORK STRATEGIES HAVEN'T WORKED
6 (1982). By 1973, only 5.0% of children receiving AFDC were eligible based on the death of their parents.
STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 102D CONG., 2D SESS., OVERVIEW OF ENTITLEMENT
PROGRAMS: BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMM.
ON WAYS AND MEANS 669 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 GREEN BOOK].
43. GILDER, supra note 5, at 111-12, 114-27; MURRAY, supra note 5, at 147-66, 178-91.
There was widespread political consensus supporting the goal of the Family Support Act of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); that is, that women who receive
AFDC become economically independent. See KATZ, supra note 12, at 229-30; Handler, supra note 13,
at 501-12. Senator Moynihan, the Act's primary sponsor, articulated its underlying behavioral modification
rationale:
One sentence [of President Bush's remarks is] especially notable. "We want to see the day when
every American child is part of a strong and stable family." The importance of this statement
is elemental. Unlike the problems of children in much of the world; age-old problems of disease,
new problems of ecological disaster, the problems of children in the United States are
overwhelmingly associated with the strength and stability of their families. Our problems do not
reside in nature, nor yet are they fundamentally economic. Our problems derive from behavior.
136 CONG. REC. S14,416-17 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1990) (statement of Sen. Moynihan).
44. MURRAY, supra note 5, at 156-62.
45. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE U.S. Gov'r FISCAL YEAR 1993 418-20 (1992).
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II. LEARNFARE
In July 1987, at the request of newly elected Governor Tommy G.
Thompson, the Wisconsin Legislature passed the first Learnfare statute.46
Leamfare programs condition AFDC eligibility on dependent children's regular
school attendance. As originally enacted, the statute targeted only teens who
were themselves parents (as opposed to all teens who were part of an AFDC
family unit) and provided that teens could not be sanctioned until after they had
been given an opportunity to participate in a school program for "children at
risk" or "school-age parents.'47 Governor Thompson used his line-item veto
power" to reshape the program: by deleting critical words and provisions, he
effectively expanded Learnfare to cover all teens receiving AFDC and eliminated
the requirement that teens be referred to special school programs before sanctions
would be imposed against them.49 The Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) approved the federal waivers50 requested for the Learnfare
portion of the Wisconsin Welfare Reform Demonstration on October 20, 1987."'
In March 1988, Wisconsin began to enforce the program against teens under
fifteen and against all teen parents. At the beginning of the 1988-89 school year
46. 1987 Wis. LAWS 27. The only other Learnfare program significantly underway is the Ohio LEAP
program, which applies only to pregnant and parenting teens who receive AFDC. Under the Ohio program
a teen parent with more than two unexcused absences in a month may be sanctioned. However, if the teen
parent enrolls in school and meets attendance requirements, she then receives a bonus of $62 each month
(the same amount as the sanction). OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5101.20 (Anderson 1992). Virginia began a
Learnfare demonstration project September 8, 1992, and Maryland is scheduled to begin one on January
1, 1993. A number of other states have implemented teen-parent initiatives under the JOBS program of the
Family Support Act, Title 11, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988); see also SARA HILL ET AL., CENTER
FOR LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY, BABIES ON BUSES: LESSONS FROM INITIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JOBS
TEEN PARENT PROVISIONS 6-10 (May 1991).
47. Enrolled 1987 Senate Bill 100 (Wis.) § 1014r & u.
48. WIs. CONST. art. V, § 10(1)(b).
49. 1987 Wis. LAWS 27. State regulations provide that at the time of the sanction, the notice of the
AFDC reduction must contain the name and telephone number of the school's at-risk program coordinator.
Wis. ADMIN. CODE § [HSS] 201.195(8)(a)(3) (Mar. 1990).
50. 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(b)(2) (199 1) specifically prohibits the denial of AFDC benefits to a minor member
of an AFDC household because the child fails to attend school or to make satisfactory grades. The waiver
request and the grant of waiver detail the many sections of the Social Security Act that were waived under
42 U.S.C. § 1315 (1991). See Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services, Wisconsin Welfare
Reform Package, Section 1115(a) Waiver Application to U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(May 1, 1987) (on file with author) [hereinafter 1987 Wisconsin Waiver Application].
51. See Lois M. QUINN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING INSTITUTE, DIVISION OF OUTREACH AND
CONTINUING EDUCATION EXTENSION, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MILWAUKEE, REPORT ON THE LEARNFARE
EVALUATION 37 (Jan. 1991); Letter from Wayne A. Stanton, Administrator, U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, to Timothy Cullen, Secretary, Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services, at
3 (Oct. 20, 1987) (on file with author). "[O]nly perfunctory attention was paid by state and Federal officials
to the evaluation requirement that is presumably a quid pro quo for granting a state's waiver request."
Wisconsin Learnfare Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Social Security and Family Policy of the
Senate Comm. on Finance, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1990) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Thomas
J. Corbett, Associate Scientist, Institute for Research on Poverty).
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the State expanded the program to include all teen dependents living with a
parent.
52
Under the program, a teen on AFDC who misses ten unexcused full days
of school in a semester is monitored monthly thereafter, and is "sanctioned"
if she or he misses two unexcused full days of school in any month 3 A
sanction reduces the family's AFDC grant by the entire amount designated for
the teen. For example, for a family consisting of a mother and two children,
this sanction results in a reduction of $77.60 a month from a total grant of
$5 1 7 .6 0 .
5' During the 1988-89 and 1989-90 school years, an average of 2,125
students were sanctioned each month. AFDC families lost $3,080,000 during
1989 alone.55
There are two official goals of the Wisconsin program. First, the program
is intended to ensure that more teenagers on AFDC complete high school or
its equivalent and thereby acquire the minimum level of education needed to
become productive citizens. Second, the program seeks to establish a relationship
of mutual responsibility between the State and AFDC recipients: the State
provides assistance to recipients in getting off, and recipients undertake
education, training, and job searches that will help them become self-
sufficient.56 At first glance, these goals seem benign; indeed, the notions that
children should stay in school and that parents should be responsible for their
children are hardly controversial. However, in historical context and in actual
operation, Learnfare reinforces the myth that social problems such as truancy
are caused by the deviant behavior of welfare recipients.
Why did this program, at this time, emerge to respond to this perceived
crisis? The answer to this question requires an examination of the underlying
premises of Learnfare. Such an examination reveals that Learnfare is based on
a series of empirically faulty assumptions. Consequently, it is not surprising
52. QUINN ET AL., supra note 51, at 21. Although the statute as signed subjected all AFDC teens to
Learnfare, the Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services limited the nonparent teen population
to those living with a natural or adoptive parent. Wis. ADMIN. CODE § [HSS] 201.195(3)(k) (Mar. 1990).
Subsequent legislation codified this limitation. 1987 Wis. LAWS 1664.
In June 1990, HHS extended the federal waiver from September 1991 to September 1994 and approved
the application of Learmfare to all AFDC children aged six and older. Letter from Jo Anne B. Barnhart,
Assistant Secretary for Family Support, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, to Patricia A.
Goodrich, Secretary, Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services (June 6, 1990) (on file with author).
The waiver extension required the counties in which 92% of the sanctioned teens reside to provide case
management services when it imposed a sanction and included additional funding for social services. Id.;
see Hearings, supra note 51, at 8-9, 11 (testimony of Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Assistant Secretary for Family
Support, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services).
53. Wis.Admin.Code§§ [HSS] 201.195(3)(g), (4)(b)(2) (Mar. 1990); JOHN PAWASARAT& LOIS QUINN,
EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING INSTITUTE, DIVISION OF OUTREACH AND CONTINUING EDUCATION, UNIVERSITY
OF WISCONSIN-MILWAUKEE, THE IMPACT OF LEARNFARE ON MILWAUKEE COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICE CLIENTS
3 (1990).
54. A detailed table of sanctions by family size is contained in QUINN Er AL., supra note 51, at 25.
55. State of Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau 90-23, An Evaluation of Learnfare Program
Administration, Department of Health and Social Services 5 (Jul. 1990) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Legislative Audit Bureau Evaluation].
56. 1987 Wisconsin Waiver Application, supra note 50, at 3.
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that the Wisconsin program-and for that matter any Learnfare program-will
fail to achieve its goals. 57 In recent years national high school dropout rates
have declined dramatically: the percentage of white adults between twenty-five
and twenty-nine years old who have not completed high school dropped from
36.3% in 1960 to 13.2% in 1985; for African Americans the figure dropped
from 60% in 1960 to 17.6% in 1985. 51 Ninety-two percent of the AFDC teens
subject to Learnfare are meeting the school attendance requirements;5 9 only
8% are sanctioned. Moreover, Wisconsin's AFDC rolls had begun to decline
in mid-1986.60 Nevertheless, this data neither dampened the support for a
punitive program for AFDC recipients nor altered the perception of a welfare
or underclass crisis.
A. Learnfare as a Method to Reduce High School Dropout Rates
If Learnfare is to achieve its first stated goal, curbing the high school drop-
out rate, several assumptions must be made: (1) the mother whose teenager skips
school is exercising her free choice within a wide range of options in allowing
the child to be truant; (2) the reason for the failure to attend school is endemic
to the child's family, not to external causes; and (3) teens are motivated by
economic incentives targeted at the family.
57. Federal regulations require that a governmental regulatory program be administered in a uniform
and objective manner. 45 C.F.R. § 233.10(a)(1)(iv) (1991). The Wisconsin experience suggests many problems,
including poor school recordkeeping, a wide variation in attendance policies among school districts, and
a fast track, noncorrective implementation. These will thwart any state's attempt at compliance. Legislative
Audit Bureau Evaluation, supra note 55, at 10-18.
In a sample of administrative hearing decisions regarding appeal of sanctions, 84% struck down the
Learnfare sanction as inconsistent with the regulations, and an additional 8% were upheld only because the
appeal was filed after the statutory time limit. Legislative Audit Bureau Evaluation, supra note 55, at 10-11.
These errors caused irreparable harm to AFDC families. For example, a computer error, which resulted in
a three-month cut in the benefits received by a family headed by a pregnant teen, caused the family to become
homeless. George Gerharz, Wisconsin's Learnfare: A Bust, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1990, at A23. In another
case, a mother of three high school students periodically lost up to one half of the $617.00 she received
each month as a result of administrative errors. Eric Harrison, Truancy Punishment Hitting Home, L.A. TIMES,
July 1, 1990, at A20. The community affairs director of Milwaukee schools admitted that as many as 50
errors a month occurred because of administrative problems. Id. at A21.
The level of record-keeping errors that resulted in sanctions led to a court order on July 10, 1990,
enjoining the state from sanctioning as many as 3,200 teens attending Milwaukee Public Schools. Kronquist
v. Goodrich, No. 89-C-1376 (E.D. Wis. July 10, 1990). In an October 23, 1990 stipulation in the case, the
state agreed to verify students' attendance records before imposing sanctions, investigate teens' reasons for
absences, and issue notices to the teens and their families when they were placed in monitoring status prior
to sanctions. Kronquist v. Goodrich, No. 89-C-1376 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 23, 1990).
58. Christopher Jencks, What is the Underclass-And is It Growing?, 12 Focus, Spring & Summer
1989, at 24, cited in Thomas Corbett et al., Learnfare: The Wisconsin Experience, 12 FOCUS, Fall & Winter
1989, at 2.
59. Hearings, supra note 5 1, at 61 (statement of Patricia A. Goodrich, Secretary, Wisconsin Department
of Health and Social Services).
60. In 1986, the year before Learnfare was enacted, the number of AFDC recipients dropped from
307,584 in April to 300,979 in June, and 296,528 in September. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, SOCIAL SEcURrrY BULLETIN, March 1988, at
70; SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN, December 1988, at 46.
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These assumptions ignore both the psychology of teenagers and the realities
of poverty. Many of the choices that middle-class families make are inconceiv-
able to poor women who do not have the option of sending their rebellious
children to a different school system or to a parochial or private school. They
cannot simply move to a less drug-infested neighborhood or put their children
into therapy or other specialized counseling.61 They may not have the money
to travel to school for parent-teacher conferences, or to pay for child care for
other children while attending them.62 Even if a mother can ensure that a teen
gets to school every morning, she cannot stay there all day, every day, to enforce
attendance. As a Milwaukee assistant principal stated, sanctioned students "are
not going to realize the value of an education by docking their parents. We've
had youngsters brought here by their Learnfare parents at 8 o'clock, and at 9
o'clock they're gone. It's in one door and out the other., 63 Moreover, Learnfare
ignores both the wealth of literature demonstrating why teens drop out of school
and the many existing programs and strategies to get them to return or remain
in school.64 The motivations for dropping out of school are complex and do
not disappear with a simple solution, however politically attractive.65
Interestingly, a staff memo from the Wisconsin Department of Health and
Social Services (DHSS) originally recommended that, in spite of Governor
Thompson's veto of this provision, teens should be referred to social services
prior to the imposition of any sanction:
Some kids have problems that prevent them from attending school or
learning if they are in school, such as drug or alcohol abuse, or
emotional problems due to abuse or neglect. These teens are most likely
61. Social services, such as case management, alternative education, children-at-risk programs, and
drug, alcohol and child abuse services for the Learnfare population in the Milwaukee Public Schools are
woefully insufficient. Legislative Audit Bureau Evaluation, supra note 55, at 28-33. For example, in one
middle school, a half-time social worker is solely responsible for the school's entire 600 student enrollment,
of whom 75% are in AFDC families. With the other half of her time, she is solely responsible for a 1000-
student school. Twelve weeks into the semester she had not addressed any of her truancy referrals because
she was addressing other problems that "are more pressing than attendance." Id. at 29. Not surprisingly,
prior to entry of the Kronquist injunction, more than 75% of those sanctioned were in Milwaukee County.
Corbett et aL., supra note 58, at 5.
62. See JONATHoN KozoL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN ANIERICA'S ScHOOLS (1992) (discussing
inner-city school systems and conditions faced by poor families).
63. Kenneth J. Cooper, Financial Penalties Prove No Easy Solution To Dropout Problem, WASH. POST,
Feb. 16, 1990, at A3 (quoting Robert Griffin, Assistant Principal, North Division High School).
64. See, e.g., CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIAL POLICY, DROPPING OUT OF HIGH SCHOOL: A
LITERATURE REVIEW (1986); JANICE EARLE, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE BOARDS OF EDUCATION,
FEiALE DROPOUTS: A NEW PERSPECTIVE (1989); Michelle Fine, Why Urban Adolescents Drop into and
out of Public High School, 87 TCHRS. C. REC. 393 (1986); Mark W. Roosa, Adolescent Mothers, School
Drop-Outs and School Based Intervention Programs, 35 FAM. REL 313 (1986); Gary G. Wehlage & Robert
A. Rutter, Dropping Out: How Much Do Schools Contribute to the Problem?, 87 TCHRS. C. REC. 374(1986).
65. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 63, at A3. Cooper interviewed Milwaukee teen paren Lorraine Bragg,
who was sanctioned for dropping out of school. She stated that her reason for dropping out of school was
that she felt classmates "were low-rating me because I had a child." Id. Rather than return to school, she
received money from her boyfriend. She later returned to an alternative school established for young mothers
because "she was jealous of her sister, a former dropout who was back in school and doing well." Id.
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to be sanctioned because parents will be unable to deal with them. They
also may be subjected to further abuse or kicked out of the home
altogether.66
The Wisconsin administration rejected this recommendation as too costly.67
The first study of the program, conducted by the nonpartisan Employment
and Training Institute of the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee (ETI),
documented the massive social service needs of those sanctioned. According
to the study, 6612 Milwaukee County teens were sanctioned in the first sixteen
months of full Learnfare operation, from September 1988 to December 1989.68
Forty-one percent of children sanctioned in Milwaukee were in families having
possible or documented problems with abuse or neglect or were involved in
the Children's Court system,69 indicating that they had social service problems
and needed major intervention through the already existing social service
system.70 Only 28% of the 6612 had returned to and were regularly attending
66. Memorandum from Diane Wailer, staff member of Department of Health and Social Services, to
Timothy Lullen, Secretary, Department of Health and Social Services, (Nov. 24,1987), quoted in PAWASARAT
& QUINN, supra note 53, at 4.
67. Id. In testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Social Security and Family Policy, the Secretary
of DHSS defended the imposition of sanctions prior to providing social services to the truant teens. She
used the following example:
[I]n Rock County we had an AFDC mother who until her sanction was to occur for her grant
because her son had been truant, had no idea that her young son was having problems, and was
in fact having alcohol and drug problems. And she was able to get help for him. The program
in Rock County was able to serve him and the young man is now back in school; and, of course,
the minute he went back to school there was no sanction.
Hearings, supra note 51, at 19 (testimony of Patricia A. Goodrich, Secretary, Wisconsin Department of Health
and Social Services). Her example, in fact, supports exactly the opposite conclusion: there are multiple and
complex reasons for truancy; the system is not effectively making parents aware when problems exist. The
offer of social services without imposing the economic hardship might have solved the problem.
In spite of the documented lack of necessary social services, Governor Thompson vetoed attempts
to increase the availability and accessibility of such services in the 1989-91 biennial budget. Corbett et al.,
supra note 58, at 7.
68. PAWASARAT & QUINN, supra note 53, at 10.
69. Id. at 15. For the first sixteen months of Learnfare, 50% of those teens sanctioned for at least ten
months came from this group; 45% of the AFDC cost savings from sanctions came from this group. Id.
70. The JOBS program of the Family Support Act of 1988, Title 11, Pub. L No. 100-485, 102 Stat.
2343 (1988) requires an assessment of family circumstances and a determination of factors relevant to
developing an employability plan for each participant, 45 C.F.R. § 250.41 (1991), as well as a conciliation
procedure to resolve disputes regarding participation prior to sanctions. 45 C.F.R. § 250.36 (1991). These
requirements were waived for 13-19 year olds under Leamfare. Letter from Tommy G. Thompson, Governor,
State of Wisconsin, to Louis Sullivan, Secretary, United States Department of Health and Human Services
14-15 (Sept. 12, 1989) (on file with author) (requesting Wisconsin Learnfare waiver); Letter from Eunice
S. Thomas, Acting Assistant Secretary, United States Department of Health and Human Services, to Patricia




school two months after their last sanction.7' Moreover, the number of sanctions
did not decline over the first two years of full implementation of the program.72
In short, teenagers may be unwilling to attend school for reasons including
external causes such as violence in the schools, inadequate school services (e.g.,
special tutoring, alternative educational programs, or drug and alcohol abuse
counseling), improper educational placement or assignment, the need to stay
at home to babysit or care for a sick sibling.73 Learnfare makes a series of
remarkable assumptions about the maturity and sophistication of teenagers,
especially given behavior problems already evident through truancy. For
Learnfare to succeed, teens must understand that their nonattendance at school
jeopardizes their family's economic stability. They must care about family
finances more than their reasons for not attending school, and they must be
willing to change their behavior to retain approximately seventy-five dollars
per month for Mom.74 Next, they must not be tempted to use their ability to
trigger a sanction as a means to threaten and control their mothers.75 In fact,
Learnfare may lead to increased family stress and create a parental incentive
to kick a child out of the home if she or he fails to attend school, thus subverting
the program's stated goal of furthering education for poor teens.76
71. PAWASARAT & QUINN, supra note 53, at 10. An analysis prepared for DHSS determined that'-70%
of the teens sanctioned were sanctioned for 3 months or less before meeting the Learnfare requirements."
Memorandum from Silvia R. Jackson, Administrator, Division of Economic Support, to Patricia A. Goodrich,
Secretary, Department of Health and Social Services (August 10, 1989) (on file with author). ETI subsequently
counseled against using either of these single figures to conclude too much because of data error, eligibility
criteria, and lack of a control group. QUINN Er AL., supra note 5 1, at 5-6. Without a control group to provide
a baseline of school attendance absent Learnfare, it is difficult to know whether any figure of returning
students is in response to Learnfare or simply the result of normal fluctuations. Hearings, supra note 51,
at 50-51 (statement of Thomas J. Corbett, Associate Scientist, Institute for Research on Poverty).
72. Learnfare Monthly Summaries, Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services (1988-1992)
(on file with author). The sanction rate declined substantially after implementation of procedural changes
stipulated in Kronquist v. Goodrich, No. 89-C-1376 (E.D. Wis. July 10, 1990), but has resumed increasing.
Id.
Targeted teens who were parents themselves were substantially more likely to be sanctioned than
dependent teens. JOHN PAWASARAT ET AL., EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING INSTITUTE, UNIVERSITY OF
WISCONSIN-MILWAUKEE, EVALUATION OF THE IMPACT OF WISCONSIN'S LEARNFARE EXPERIMENT ON THE
SCHOOL ATTENDANCE OF TEENAGERS RECEIVING AID TO FAMILIES WITH DEPENDENT CHILDREN 15 (Feb.
1992); QUINN ET AL, supra note 51, at 19. This fact may indicate the more complex needs and responsibilities
of this group and a lesser ability of school systems to incorporate those needs and responsibilities as factors
overriding the economic disincentive of Learnfare.
73. Even if one assumes strict limits and punishment are required to affect teen behavior, reducing family
grant size is ineffective. Some states have responded to the truancy problem by removing an asset valued
by the teen. For example, Arkansas and West Virginia have experimented with revoking the driver's licenses
of teens who have dropped out of school. ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-222 (Michie Supp. 1991); W. VA. CODE
§ 18-8-11 (1988).
74. Wisconsin's Governor Thompson, responding to critics contending his Wedfare proposal (to pay
AFDC teens an extra $75 if they got married) would encourage loveless marriages, commented: "Would
you get married for $75 a month? I don't know anybody who would be dumb enough to say, 'I'm going
to get married to get an extra $75 month."' CLASP UPDATE, supra note 8, at 8 (quoting Governor Thompson).
Of course, if teens would not get married for an extra $75 a month, Thompson's proposal would not work.
75. Hearings, supra note 51, at55 (statement of CaroIl L. Croce, Executive Director, Wisconsin Nutrition
Project).
76. See THEODORE R. MARMOR ET AL., AMERICA'S MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE STATE 219 (1990)
("In the extreme, disincentives might be perceived as incentives, thus reversing the expected direction of
19921
The Yale Law Journal
But debates about Learnfare have generally not focused on the empirical
validity of the program's underlying assumptions. As the Institute for Research
on Poverty noted in criticizing the DHSS' claim of the program's success, no
information exists regarding how teens with attendance problems behave in the
absence of sanctions. Improved attendance (which did not ultimately result) might
be the result of increased cooperation between parents and the welfare system
rather than economic sanctions.77 The dramatic increase in the number of teens
sanctioned as the program's first year progressed raises serious doubts about
the ability of Learnfare to deter absences.
B. Learnfare as a Tool for Social Contract
The second articulated goal of Learnfare is to create a "social contract"
between the government and the welfare family.78 In other words, in exchange
for receiving assistance, the family must comply with certain values or modify
its behavior in ways deemed appropriate by policymakers.79 Once again, this
goal is predicated on faulty assumptions. The first is that welfare families are
different than average families, that is, that AFDC teens are more likely to be
truant than teens in non-AFDC poor families and that an AFDC mother is less
responsible for her children's school attendance, less of a parent than the average
parent, and does not want the best for her children.80 Another faulty assumption
is that the average non-AFDC family whose child is truant is not receiving
"assistance" and therefore should not be required to fulfill a "social contract"
with the state.81
Available data confirms that children in AFDC families do not miss
significantly more days of school than other children. The fact that even
knowledgeable policymakers such as Senator Moynihan hold the misconception
that AFDC children are different from the norm was apparent in a particularly
telling exchange at hearings on Learnfare before the Senate Finance Committee:
change.").
77. Memorandum from Charles Manski et al., Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin-
Madison, to John Antaramian, Member, Wisconsin Assembly (Sept. 1, 1989) (on file with author).
78. Compare MEAD, supra note 3, at 241-46 ("Benefits must be coupled with meaningful economic
and moral obligations from recipients.") with Corbett et al., supra note 58, at 7 ("[T]he lack of services is
evidence that government is not living up to its part of the 'social contract."').
79. See 1987 ,Wisconsin Waiver Application, supra note 50, at 10 (explaining expectations about
recipients' behavior).
80. Learnfare is seen as a way to get the attention of otherwise disinterested parents. "One way of
encouraging attendance among low-income students, those who have been shown to be the most at-risk of
dropping out of school is to reduce welfare benefits to parents who fail to take steps to insure that their
children attend school as required by law." JosrE FOEHRENBACH, CENTER FOR LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY,
PREPARING FOR LEARNFARE: SETTING THE CONDmONS FOR A QUESTIONABLE EXPERIMENT 2 (1988) (quoting
California's Commission on Educational Quality).




Ms. BARNHART: That is, a student must have 10 unexcused
absences in a semester before he/she is put on monitoring. Once they
are monitored by the State, if they have two absences in a particular
month, unexcused absences, at that point the sanction would be
undertaken.
Senator MOYNIHAN: What is the norm for your all-American
Wisconsin boy or girl? Ten is twice the average?
Ms. BARNHART: I don't know exactly what the average is, Senator.
I believe the information indicates that the AFDC students, as opposed
to non-AFDC students, miss about 3 days a year more than the non-
AFDC students. I can tell you that relationship.
Senator MOYNIHAN: It is only 3 more days a year?
Ms. BARNHART: Roughly, I believe so.
Senator MOYNIHAN: Unbelievable.
Ms. BARNHART: I believe that's correct. One of the other people
coming up later might have better information, but I think that is the
case.
Senator MOYNIHAN: That is kind of important.
82
Consistent with this testimony, when the Wisconsin legislature was deciding
whether to expand Learnfare to cover six- to twelve-year olds, a study by the
Urban Research Center of the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee reported that
"[flor all students in grades two through five only 3 median attendance days
and 3.9 mean attendance days, separate non-AFDC students from AFDC
students. 83 AFDC children on average attended school 169 days a year while
non-AFDC children attended for 172 days.84 This data has been consistent over
many years.
Many families that have gone through a social services assessment and
licensing process by the state to become foster families or family day care
providers have received sanctions for their teens under Learnfare.Y The bizarre
fact that families that the state has approved for child raising are later penalized
by the same state for inappropriate child control highlights the irrationality of
the Learnfare attendance requirements.86
AFDC mothers place a strong emphasis on education for their children. In
a recent study of AFDC recipients, 82% stated that education was what it "would
82. Hearings, supra note 51, at 14 (testimony of Jo Anne B. Bamhart, Assistant Secretary for Family
Support, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services).
83. WILLIAM F. MCMAHON ET AL., THE URBAN RESEARCH CENTER, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-
MILWAUKEE, Do SCHOOL ATTENDANCE RATES VARY BETWEEN AFDC AND NON-AFDC SUPPORTED
CHILDREN? 4 (1989).
84. Id. at 3 (Tables I and 3).
85. Almost 40% of the children in foster care and nearly 60% of the children in families that provide
family day care were with families in which a sanction had occurred. PAWASARAT & QUINN, supra note
53, at 13.
86. See supra note 52 (discussing Wisconsin's decision not to impose Learnfare requirements on teens
in foster care).
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take .for their children to get ahead., 87 AFDC mothers agreed with both the
general public and members of Congress that improvement of public schools
should be either the first or second priority among mechanisms to solve
poverty.
88
Learnfare, however, blames the mother, assuming that she is at fault for
her child's behavior, regardless of the availability of needed services. It ignores
the fact that there will be some teens who will not respond to any social services
or incentive (positive or negative) program and that our society already maintains
a juvenile justice system to cope with these difficult teens.89 As one AFDC
mother said, "[E]ven probation officers can't make their clients do something
if they don't want to." 9 This mother of four wondered whether she should
place her two truant teens in care of the county and "let them raise them if they
think they can do better."9'
Contrast the relationship the government has with non-AFDC parents whose
children are truant. Non-AFDC families receive a major tax break for each
dependent;" no one questions their continued right to receive this dependency
allowance or suggests conditioning that right on the child's school attendance
record. State truancy laws are enforced with wide discretion and latitude; there
is certainly no automatic judicial referral after ten days absence in a semester.93
In many states, parents who are not on AFDC can be assessed only a small
financial penalty for a child's truancy, and this penalty can be assessed only
after a wide range of social services are provided to the truant's family.' One
AFDC mother commented on the perversity of singling out poor women:
All my sons skipped school more than twice a month. Did my sons
graduate? Yes. Did they get jobs? Yes. Could I keep them in school
by threatening them? No. I discovered that my sons played hooky at
the homes of their friends, who had employed parents and VCRs.
Though their friends skipped school and harbored truants, neither they
87. FAY LOMAX COOK ET AL, CENTER FOR URBAN AFFAIRS AND POLICY RESEARCH, NORTHWESTERN
UNIVERSITY, CONVERGENT PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY: THE VIEWS FROM THE GENERAL
PUBLIC, MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, AND AFDC RECIPIENTS 5-49 (1988).
88. Id. at 5-55.
89. See Hearings, supra note 51, at 39 (testimony of Carol L. Croce, Executive Director, Wisconsin
Nutrition Project).
90. Pat Gowens, Welfare, Learnfare- Unfair! A Letter to My Governor, Ms., Sept./Oct. 1991, at 90-91.
91. Id.
92. See infra note 128.
93. In the Milwaukee public school system, only 95 of the 7,618 students identified as habitual truants
in the fall semester of 1989 were referred to the District Attorney's Office. Legislative Audit Bureau
Evaluation, supra note 55, at 28.
94. For example, in Massachusetts the maximum penalty is $20, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 76, §
3 (West 1992), as opposed to $95 a month or 16% of the monthly AFDC grant for a family of three. In
Wisconsin a parent can be referred to the district attorney for Children's Court action or criminal prosecution
only after a failure to cooperate with the school's documented efforts to provide services. Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 118.16(5) (West 199 1). Even then, the assistant district attorney first tries to work with the family to return
the child to school, only beginning legal action when parents fail to cooperate in these efforts. Legislative
Audit Bureau Evaluation, supra note 55, at 28-29.
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nor their parents suffer from the Learnfare "experiment." Class status,
not truancy alone, determined who would be abused by Learnfare.95
Not surprisingly, the recent study of the effectiveness of Learnfare by ET196
showed no positive results, concluding that "in all six school districts the models
used did not show improvement in student attendance which could be attributed
to the Leamfare requirement."9 7 In Milwaukee the study found that Learnfare
actually increased rather than decreased absences.98
After selecting ETI as the independent evaluator, the Wisconsin DHSS
cancelled ETI's contract for the final Learnfare report due June, 1993. 99 DHSS
Secretary Gerald Whitburn called the study the "biased product of liberal
opponents of the Republican Governor.' '1to
Even before ETI's evaluation was completed, school officials knew that
Learnfare was not meeting its stated goals. 1 ' The assistant principal of a
Milwaukee high school, where more than half of the families of the 1250
students receive welfare, noted that few of the 145 sanctioned students were
present on the second day of final exams, 10 2 and Milwaukee's mayor described
Learnfare as an unsuccessful experiment. 03 The Milwaukee Public School
Board of School Directors opposed the Learnfare Program and its expansion
in its February, 1990 statement, relying on a report from the Milwaukee Public
School Superintendent that concluded: "The existing Learnfare program has not
been shown to be effective in returning teenagers to school; it has not increased
school attendance; and it has not reduced the number of school dropouts. In
addition, the number of monthly sanctions does not appear to be declining."1' 4
95. Gowens, supra note 90, at 90.
96. QUINN ET AL, supra note 51. Because the federal waiver of the demonstration project allowed
Wisconsin to make all AFDC teens subject to Learnfare, thus precluding a randomly assigned control group
of AFDC teens, the study was based on a lagged regression analysis which controlled for differences in
age, grade level, sex, race, and months on AFDC. The control group was drawn from former AFDC teenagers
and teens receiving AFDC prior, to the Learnfare experiment. PAWASARAT ET AL., supra note 72, at 3.
97. Id. at ii. Graduation rates for Milwaukee teens subject to Learnfare were the same as those for the
control group-former AFDC Milwaukee teens who entered high school as freshmen in the 1987-88 school
year. Id. at 11. The impact of Ohio's LEAP program on school attendance is not yet known. DAN BLOOM
ET AL., LEAP: IMPLEMENTING A WELFARE INITIATIVE TO IMPROVE SCHOOL ATTENDANCE AMONG TEENAGE
PARENTS 13-14 (1991).
98. PAWASARAT ET AL, supra note 72, at 18.
99. Letter from Richard Lorang, Deputy Secretary, Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services,
to Nicholas W. Schultz, Assistant Dean, Graduate School, Employment and Training Institute, University
of Visconsin-Milwaukee (March 10, 1992) (on file with author). This cancellation followed an unsuccessful
attempt by the state to revise or delay issuance of the report until state legislation on Leamfare expansion
had been voted upon. Judith M. Davidoff, Learnfare: State Rips 'Bias,' Shows Own, ISTHMUS CHRON., Feb.
28, 1992 at 5.
100. Lucy Howard & Ned Zeman, Wisconsin Is Talking .... NEWSWEEK, March 2, 1992, at 10.
101. Cf. QUINN Er AL., supra note 51, at 34 (reporting that 30% of surveyed school districts saw
improved attendance, contrasted with 56% that saw "no observed change," and 20% that"observed dropouts
returning to school where Learnfare or AFDC payments were identified as a reason").
102. Cooper, supra note 63, at A3.
103. Harrison, supra note 57, at A20 (quoting John Norquist, Mayor, Milwaukee, Wis.).
104. Legislative Audit Bureau Evaluation, supra note 55, at 20.
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Learnfare's failure seriously challenges the notion that using threats to cut
subsistence programs influences the behavior of those who depend on them. 5
Designed to serve political rhetoric, the program was never supported by
empirical data,'0 6 but rather, was premised on superficial notions about the
psychology of poor families.
III. FAMILY CAP
Building on the historic biases reflected in the suitable home and "man-in-
the-house" rules, the Family Cap demonstration proposals attempt to influence
poor women's decisions about procreation. They are inherently flawed because
they are based on the assumption that the value systems of AFDC mothers are
fundamentally alien to those of the rest of the population. The proposals,
embraced by President Bush, eliminate or reduce additional AFDC benefits for
the support of additional children conceived after a mother begins receiving
AFDC. New Jersey became the first state to pursue this course of action when
it enacted Family Cap legislation on January 21, 1992.107 It received a federal
waiver on July 20, 1992.08 Wisconsin has received a waiver from HHS to
operate a demonstration project for teen mothers only,109 but has not yet
received state legislative authorization."0
105. Even Charles Murray has stated: "The idea that they were going to make Learnfare work is
ridiculous.... I know I'm known for putting great stock in economic incentives, but the problem with
economic incentives like this one is that if they aren't intertwined with social norms, their effect will be
zip." Paul Taylor, Welfare Policy's 'New Paternalism' Uses Benefits to Alter Recipient's Behavior, WASH.
POST, June 8, 1991, at A3 (quoting Charles Murray).
106. The Secretary of the Wisconsin DHSS reported that at the time the program was enacted, the State
"did not have figures that would show ... that AFDC youngsters were dropping out... more than non-AFDC
youngsters." Hearings, supra note 51, at 18 (testimony of Patricia A. Goodrich, Secretary, Wisconsin
Department of Health and Social Services).
107. Act of Jan. 21, 1992, ch. 526, 1991 N.J. Sess. Law. Serv. 526 (West). In New Jersey, mothers
receive $64 per month for the support of each additional child. 1992 GREEN BOOK, supra note 42, at 639.
Under its Family Cap statute, any AFDC recipient who has a child while eligible for AFDC would receive
no additional benefits.
108. Letter from Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Assistant Secretary for Children and Families, Department of
Health and Human Services, to Alan J. Gibbs, Commissioner, Department of Human Services (July 20, 1992)
(on file with author).
109. According to the waiver documents, the Parental and Family Responsibility Demonstration Project
(PFR) will apply to AFDC teen applicants (single or married) under age 20 who have one child or are pregnant
with their first child when they enroll in PFR. The project will be implemented in as many as four counties,
including Milwaukee, and is expected to become effective July 1, 1993. Under PFR, if a second child is
born, the family will receive approximately one half of the current incremental amount ($38); if a third child
is born, the family will receive no additional income. Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services,
Parental and Family Responsibility Demonstration Project, Waiver Application to U.S Department of Health
and Human Services 2, 11-12, 18-19 (Mar. 13, 1992) (on file with author) [hereinafter 1992 Wisconsin Waiver
Application].
110. The Wisconsin Legislature passed a bill authorizing two other initiatives of the Parental
Responsibility Program but not the Family Cap. Enrolled 1991 Assembly Bill 91 (Wis.) § 1479. Governor
Thompson, however, vetoed the substance of the bill, retaining only the language authorizing the DHSS
to seek a federal waiver for an unspecified parental responsibility pilot project. 1991 WIs. Legis. Serv. 39
(West). In his veto message, Governor Thompson stated that he would do his "utmost to see to it that this
important program receives a federal waiver and is implemented in Wisconsin." Governor's Message Vetoing
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Wisconsin offered two reasons for testing a Family Cap Program: (1) to
reduce long-term Welfare dependency among families headed by male and female
teen parents;... and (2) to delay subsequent births to first-time teen parents
who receive AFDC until they are emotionally and financially prepared to support
additional children.112 The New Jersey proposal applies to all AFDC mothers
regardless of age; its goal is a more extensive effort at "mutual responsi-
bility."1 3 The proposal contends that "welfare recipients will be asked to make
the same type of decisions based on their income that working families have
to make about supporting their family based on the money they earn."'1 4 The
underlying goal of Family Cap programs is for people to plan for their children;
the assumption is that middle-class people are intelligent enough to refrain from
having children when they cannot support them and that poor women should
do likewise. The unspoken motivation is far less racially benign: the stereotypical
AFDC mother is African American, urban, lazy, and a "bad mother" who gets
pregnant to obtain more AFDC benefits. It follows, according to the argument,
that the denial of these additional benefits will curb the pregnancies that the
policymakers find so troubling.
As was the case with the Learnfare programs, the underlying assumptions
of Family Cap proposals-that AFDC mothers have many children, that they
have free access to medical options for family planning, and that they get
pregnant in order to receive additional benefits-are unsound. In fact, as of 1990,
the average AFDC family, including adults, had 2.9 members; 72.5% of all
families on AFDC had only one or two children, and almost 90% had three or
fewer children. 5 These figures are no larger than those found among two-
Enrolled 1991 Assembly Bill 91 (Aug. 8, 1991), reprinted in 1991 V'is. Laws 39.
I11. A high correlation exists between teen childbearing and receipt of AFDC. Nearly 50% of all
adolescent mothers and over 75% of unmarried teen mothers receive AFDC within five years of giving birth.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFIcE, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, SOURCES OF SUPPORT FOR ADOLESCENT
MOTHERS xvi (1990). Evaluations of the total length of time on AFDC vary depending on the time standards
used. Compare id. (reporting that almost 50% of adolescent mothers who receive AFDC stop getting benefits
for at least three months within one year, and almost 75% leave AFDC within three years) with Greg J.
Duncan et al., Welfare Dependence Within and Across Generations, ScIENcE, Jan. 29, 1988, at 467, 468
(asserting that more than 40% of never-married women with young children who began receiving AFDC
when they were under 25 years continue to receive it for more than nine years).
112. 1992 Wisconsin Waiver Application, supra note 109, at 1.
113. New Jersey Department of Human Services, Family Development Program, Waiver Application
to U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 25 (June 5, 1992) (on file with author) [hereinafter 1992
New Jersey Waiver Application].
114. Id. Because the New Jersey Family Cap proposal is part ofa broader Family Development Program
that includes an increased earnings disregard, the program "is based on the same principle that applies to
everyone else in our society. If a person is working and has a baby, that person's salary is not automatically
increased.... We believe that if a person is given a choice, that person will do what is best for the family
which, in this case, is work." Id. at 8. This comment reveals another underlying assumption of the New
Jersey program-that AFDC mothers do not work because they can receive AFDC benefits. The relationship
between work and welfare is a topic that has engendered a great deal of commentary and is beyond the scope
of this Essay. See, e.g., ELLWOOD, supra note 38, at 137-55 (suggesting that current work-welfare programs
do little to solve poverty and welfare struggles that single mothers face).
115. 1992 GREEN BOOK, supra note 42, at 669.
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parent families in the general population. 16 Moreover, AFDC family size has
declined substantially; in 1969, 32.5% of AFDC families had four or more
children, and in 1990, only 9.9% had four or more children.1 7 Contrary to
the commonly held perception that teen pregnancies are skyrocketing, teen
birthrates have dropped dramatically over the last three decades.1 '
Furthermore, for those women who wish to terminate their pregnancies,
neither abortion facilities nor government funding are necessarily available. 19
Title X of the Public Health Service Act, the only federal program targeted for
the provision of family planning services, was cut by 16% during the 1980's."2
In addition, even when a woman does obtain birth control, the failure rates for
the most reliable forms of contraceptives (i.e., the pill, diaphragms, condoms)
range from 6% to 16% per year.'
There are many reasons why AFDC mothers become pregnant or choose
to remain pregnant. These reasons include occurrences of unplanned pregnancies
(whether due to a lack of information, money, or forethought), the belief that
a child solidifies a relationship with the father,22 the assumption that children
116. Of all U.S. families, married couples with children under age 18 have an average of 1.88 children
each. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS,
HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS: MARCH 1991 (1992). In fact, the birth rate of AFDC mothers
in Wisconsin is 39% lower than the rates for the general population. Furthermore, the longer a woman remains
on welfare, the less likely she is to give birth. See Mark R. Rank, Fertility Among Women On Welfare:
Incidence and Determinants, 54 AM. SOC. REV. 296, 301 (1989).
117. 1992 GREEN BOOK, supra note 42, at 669. The Director of Maine's Bureau of Income Maintenance,
citing a 20 year review of state data showing a substantive decrease in AFDC family size, resigned rather
than support the Maine Governor's Family Cap proposal. SabraBurdick, Statement on Resigning as Director,
Bureau of Income Maintenance, Maine (Feb. 5,1992), quoted in CLASP STATES NETWORK UPDATE (Center
for Law and Social Policy, Washington, D.C.), Feb. 19, 1992, at 11 [hereinafter FEB. CLASP UPDATE].
118. The teen birthrate per 1000 females aged 15-19 was 89.1 in 1960,68.3 in 1970, and 58.1 in 1989.
1992 GREEN BOOK, supra note 42, at 1093; CHILD TRENDS, INC., FACTS AT A GLANCE 1 (Jan. 1992).
Although the birth rate for African-American teens has always been higher than for white teens, the Birth
Rate for African-American teens has fallen with some fluctuation over the longterm, from 156.1 births per
1000 in 1960 to 115.0 births in 1989. 1992 GREEN BOOK, supra note 42, at 1098. Further, although pregnancy
rates for white women have been increasing since 1986 and for African-American women since 1984, id.
at 1093, this rise cannot be credited to an increase in the economic incentive of AFDC benefits, since the
value of AFDC benefits has been substantially declining since 1972. The average monthly payment per
recipient in 1972 was $170.32 in 1990 dollars, but only $136 in 1990. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN, ANNUAL STATISTICAL
SUPPLEMENT 108 (1992) [hereinafter SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN].
119. This Essay does not detail the complexities of Medicaid abortion funding. Suffice it to say that
the Supreme Court has held that the Constitution does not require the government to finance abortions. Harris
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469 (1977). Some state courts, however,
have construed their state constitutions to the contrary. See Judith 0. Brown et al., The Failure of Gender
Equality: An Essay in Constitutional Dissonance, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 573, 637 (1987) (collecting cases).
120. Ross Danielson et al., Title X and Family Planning Services for Men, 20 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 234,
234 (1988). But see KRISTIN A. MOORE, THE URBAN INSTITUTE, POLICY DETERMINANTS OF TEENAGE
CHILDBEARING 63 (1980) (listing studies that document importance of family planning services to reduce
low-income teen pregnancy, but finding measures of family planning availability not associated with lower
levels of fertility).
121. SUSAN HARLAP ET AL., ALAN GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, PREVENTING PREGNANCY, PROTECTING
HEALTH: A NEW LOOK AT BIRTH CONTROL CHOICES IN THE UNITED STATES 120 (1991).
122. ELuAH ANDERSON, STREETWISE 119 (1990). If this is the motivation, then a much stronger economic
incentive, such as the earnings of the man, must be factored in.
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represent an economic value (e.g., to serve as agricultural workers, to support
parents in their old age),"TI the belief that the significant health problems and
infant mortality rates associated with poverty increase the risk that a single
woman with only one child will become childless,"A a sense that one's life
is so hopeless that having a child gives it value and meaning, 15 and the desire
to give a grandchild to one's own mother.1 26 Many of these reasons are equally
applicable to non-AFDC, middle-class women.
"Normal" women allegedly have children only when they are economically
able to support them.' 27 This is not true. Most people do not view having a
baby as the prize for having made it economically, nor do they have a child
to gain an additional tax deduction for a dependent.s Just like AFDC
recipients, they want to be parents and to share their lives with a child. 29 Of
course, some families decide not to have an additional child because they believe
that they cannot afford it, but the dollar value placed on whether they can afford
it varies widely. Therefore, many upper-income families may have a small
number of children because they believe it is critical to provide the child with
certain advantages, such as piano lessons or private school education, that never
enter the minds of a working class family with more children.
Empirical studies have consistently documented the lack of a correlation
between the receipt of AFDC benefits and the child-bearing decisions of
unmarried women-even for young, unmarried women. 30 In a recent study
123. Cf. Albert A. Fitzpatrick, The Estate Value ofa Child, 25 J. FAM. L. 529,531 (1987) (discussing
economic value of children in context of childbearing costs).
124. NATIONAL CONMM'N TO PREVENT INFANT MORTALITY, TROUBLING TRENDS PERSIST. SHOIrCHANG-
ING AMERICA'S NEXT GENERATION viii-ix, 17 (1992).
125. Given the correlation between lack of literacy skills, teen pregnancy, and long-term welfare use,
a focus on improved school districts, remedial education, and specially tailored programs that provide these
teens (before or after becoming mothers) with basic skills is a critical link to reducing teen pregnancy.
CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, ADOLESCENT PREGNANCY PREVENTION CLEARINGHOUSE, MODEL PROGRAMS:
PREVENTING ADOLESCENT PREGNANCY AND BUILDING YOUTH SELF-SUFFICIENCY 14-15 (1986) [hereinafter
PREVENTING ADOLESCENT PREGNANCY].
126. MOORE, supra note 120, at 5; PREVENTING ADOLESCENT PREGNANCY, supra note 125, at 3-4
(discussing lack of both self-esteem and sex education as significant factors contributing to increased teen
pregnancy).
127. Ellen Goodman, Welfare Mothers With an Atritude, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 16, 1992, at 19.
128. Such an analysis ignores that when another child is born into a "working" family, the "benefit"
received through a federal tax deduction is higher in actual dollars than the incremental amount received
by an AFDC recipient in most states. For example, a married couple with one child and income up to $48,700
in 1992 receives a federal tax savings of $345 per year for an additional child; a married couple with one
child and income between $48,700 and $99,450 receives a federal tax savings of $645 a year for an additional
child. CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES ET AL, SELECTED BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON WELFARE
PROGRAMS, FAMILY CAP PROPOSALS WILL NOT PREVENT PREGNANCY BUT WILL HARM FAMILIEs 2 (Feb.
21, 1992). See also Ross, supra note 81, at 1520 (speculating that if states were to defend federal ceiling
on number of dependents that could be claimed for tax purposes as rationally providing family planning
incentives, public outcry would be far more persuasive and impassioned than it has been against family
planning proposals for "morally weak" poor).
129. Even among the general population, studies demonstrate that 37% of all births are unintended.
Jacqueline D. Forrest, Unintended Pregnancy Among American Women, 19 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 76 (1987).
130. MOORE, supra note 120, at 62; The Effect of Government Policies on Out-of-Wedlock Sex and
Pregnancy, 9 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 164 (1977). See also WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVAN-
TAGED 78-81 (1987). But see Robert D. Plotnick, Welfare and Out-of-Wedlock Childbearing: Evidence from
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of AFDC recipients by the Center for Urban Affairs and Policy Research, 100%
of the mothers said their ability to receive AFDC had no effect on the decision
to have a child.131 In addition, AFDC families are not larger in those states
with larger AFDC grants,132 and teen birth rates are not higher in the states
with higher AFDC grants.133 The number of female-headed families has
continued to grow since the early 1970's, even though AFDC benefits, adjusted
for inflation, have decreased by 30%. 31 Women receiving AFDC are less likely
than non-AFDC recipients to want an additional child,135 less likely to have
multiple pregnancies, and more likely to practice contraception. 36
Furthermore, the incremental increase that an AFDC family receives when
a new child enters the family is so small that it does not even cover such basic
essentials as diapers, clothing, bottles and formula. In Wisconsin, for example,
an additional third child adds $100 to the grant; in New Jersey, $64; in
Mississippi, $24.137 Thus if economics were really the driving factor in an
AFDC mother's decision to have a child, she would make the "rational" decision
not to do so.
If Mississippi's economic disincentive of giving only an additional $24 for
another child has not reduced AFDC family size or curbed teenage birth rate,
Wisconsin's reducing the grant increment from $77 to $39 is also likely to be
ineffective. 38 If poor people do not change their behavior based on the
the 1980s, 52 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 735 (1990). This is an excellent example of how the scope of the inquiry
defines the debate; by focusing on whether AFDC fosters pregnancy, discussion is diverted from true solutions
for teenage pregnancy.
131. COOK ET AL., supra note 87, at 5-40.
I didn't decide [to have a baby]. I didn't know anything about babies at the time. I wanted to
be with [my boyfriend].... My mom said no. I snuck out and saw him anyway and BINGO!
I got pregnant. I had my cake and had to eat it too.
Id. at 5-40 (quoting unnamed AFDC recipient).
132. Mississippi, the state with the highest percentage of families with four or more children, has the
lowest AFDC grant level of any state in the country and only increases the grant level by $24 for each
additional child. Conversely, Maine and Vermont, the two states with the lowest percentage of families with
four or more children, have AFDC grant levels well above the national median. FAMILY SUPPORT
ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, 1989 AFDC RECIPIENT CHARAcTERis-
TICS STUDY 24 (Table 6) (1991); 1992 GREEN BOOK, supra note 42, at 638-39.
133. The five states with the highest teen birth rates for 18-19 year olds (Arizona, Arkansas, Mississippi,
Nevada, and New Mexico) all have AFDC benefits below the national median; the five states with the lowest
18-19 year old teen birth rates (Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and Vermont)
all have AFDC benefits above the national median. CHILD TRENDS, INC., supra note 118, at 5 (Table 2);
SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN, supra note 118, at 306.
134. ELLWOOD, supra note 38, at 59-61, 77.
135. In a study of New York mothers who recently had their first child, AFDC recipients desired fewer
children than other recent first-time mothers. Harriet B. Presser & Linda S. Salsberg, Public Assistance and
Early Family Formation: Is there a Pronatalist Effect?, 23 SOC. PROB. 226,230-31 (1975). African-American
AFDC recipients who were unmarried at the time they had their first child likewise did not desire more
children than did African-American non-AFDC recipients. Id. at 233.
136. Paul J. Placek & Gerry E. Hendershot, Public Welfare and Family Planning: An Empirical Study
of the "Brood Sow" Myth, 21 SOC. PROB. 658, 666, 668 (1974).
137. 1992 GREEN BOOK, supra note 42, at 638-39.
138. MARK GREENBERG, CENTER FOR LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY, WISCONSIN'S TEEN WELFARE WAIVER:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE PARENTAL AND FAMILY RESPONSIBILITY DEMONSTRATION PROJECT 4 (1992).
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strongest economic motivator-living well below the poverty level13 9-the
additional economic incentive of a $70 AFDC reduction is certainly non-
determinative."4
IV. THE METHOD BEHIND THE MADNESS
In the face of uniform data that Learnfare, Family Cap, and other behavioral
modification "welfare reform" proposals will not accomplish their articulated
goals, why do policymakers, politicians, and the American public continue to
espouse and support them?141 Why does American society cling to the myth
that unlike the majority, welfare recipients have deviant values that can be
manipulated solely by the economics of a meager AFDC grant? 42 What has
changed since the passage of the Social Security Act during the New Deal? Have
those changes affected our historical ambivalence toward and perceptions of
poor women and children? The answer to these questions lies in a New Right
agenda, 143 which I call an ideology of division, playing to America's deepest
racial fears and to resentment of the poor, single, unemployed mother.
144
Beginning in the early 1980's, the New Right's economic strategy was to
privilege the rich, thereby causing the "trickle down" of largesse from the
wealthy to the poor. The articulated ideology was that by investing, the wealthy
would create opportunities for those less fortunate.145 However, the result of
supply-side economics has been redistribution of money to the rich, increased
poverty, and a decline of the buying power of wages.1 46 To legitimate the
139. Ross, supra note 81, at 1510.
140. See MARMOR ET AL., supra note 76, at 219-22 (discussing limits of economic incentives for
behavioral change).
141. A recent California poll conducted by the Field Institute found that 87% of respondents favored
Governor Pete Wilson's Learnfare proposal (10% opposed) and 58% favored his Family Cap proposal (37%
opposed). Vlae Kershner, Californians Split Over Governor's Welfare Plan, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 4, 1992,
at A 1. A poll of Milwaukee County residents found that 70% supported reducing grants to welfare families
whose children skip school. Paul Taylor, Debating The Lesson of Learnfare: Does Cutting Welfare Reduce
Truancy?, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 1992, at A17.
142. In 1971, a poll found that 63% of Americans strongly agreed or tended to agree that unmarried
women on welfare had babies to increase their AFDC grants. Opinion Research Corporation Survey, May
25, 1971, available in DIALOG, File No. 468. In 1985, a public opinion poll found that 48% of Americans
nationwide believed that poor women get pregnant in order to receive AFDC. I. A. Lewis & William
Schneider, Hard Times: The Public On Poverty, PUB. OPINION, June/July 1985, at 2, 7.
143. The conservative Manhattan Institute financially supported the writing of Gilder's Wealth and
Poverty and Murray's Losing Ground. It hired someone to run the "Murray campaign," spent $15,000 to
send 700 free copies of the book to "influential politicians, academics, and journalists," booked Murray on
talk shows, and organized a seminar "with intellectuals and journalists influential in policy circles." KATZ,
supra note 12, at 152; FRED BLOCK ET AL., THE MEAN SEASON: THE ATTACK ON THE WELFARE STATE
51 (1987).
144. See, e.g., GILDER, supra note 5, at 135; MURRAY, supra note 5, at 126-27, 133.
145. GILDER, supra note 5, at 67.
146. KEVIN PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF RICH AND POOR 8-23 (1990). In 1974, 11.4% of year-round,
full-time workers had low annual earnings ($4,843/yr, or $2.42/hr); in 1990, that number, when adjusted
for inflation, rose to 17.8%. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS, CONSUMER INCOME, SERIES P-60, NO. 178, WORKERS WITH LOW EARNINGS: 1964
TO 1990, 4 (1992) [hereinafter WORKERS WITH Low EARNINGS]. In 1990, 17.1% of the U.S. population
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failure of their economic agenda, the New Right sought to divert workers'
justified anger from the wealthy and to focus it on welfare recipients, those who,
it was argued, had not seized the offered opportunity, did not share the national
work ethic, and whose values seemed to deviate dramatically from the national
ideology.147
The articulation of the "otherness"' 4  of the poor-their amorality and
depravity-is longstanding. 149 But the unique contribution of the American
New Right has been to manipulate public attitudes through the subtle use of
racism, scapegoating and stereotypes. It is no accident that the bulk of
conservative scholarship about public assistance has focused on AFDC, the social
welfare program that highlights most graphically race and gender
distinctions. 50 Thus the New Right has achieved popular acceptance for the
misuse of AFDC laws,' 5' shifting our attention from national structural
problems to the purported social deviance of individual women of color.
152
earned less than half the median income, up from 12.5% in 1970. MICHAEL WOLFF Er AL., WHERE WE
STAND 23 (1992). Of U.S. families, 5.4% had a total income of over $100,000 in 1990, up from 2.4% in
1970 (1990 dollars). At the other end of the income spectrum, 3.6% of families had incomes under $5,000
in 1990, up from 2.4% in 1970 (1990 dollars). BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, CONSUMER INCOME SERIES P-60, NO. 174, MONEY INCOME OF
HOUSEHOLDS, FAMILIES, AND PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES: 1990, 199 (1991). The median income of
families with a family head younger than 30 dropped 32.1% between 1973 and 1990. CHILDREN'S DEFENSE
FUND & NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY'S CENTER FOR LABOR MARKET STUDIES, VANISHING DREAMS: THE
ECONOMIC PLIGHT OF AMERICA'S YOUNG FAMILIES 6 (1992).
147. See GILDER, supra note 5, at 45. See also MEAD, supra note 3, at 65-66; LAWRENCE M. MEAD,
THE NEW POLITICS OF POVERTY: THE NONWORKING POOR IN AMERICA 49-52 (1992) [hereinafter MEAD,
NONWORKING POOR].
148. Feminist theory provides a powerful critique of the idea that the "other" is less worthy. See, e.g.,
MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW (1990);
DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER (1989).
149. See Ross, supra note 81, at 1502-08 (documenting historical consistency of society's depiction
of poor as socially deviant or patently immoral).
150. See GILDER, supra note 5, at 114-27, 132-41; MEAD, NONWORKING POOR, supra note 147, at
53-54, 79-80, 83, 116-19; MURRAY, supra note 5, at 61, 157-66. Public assistance for the elderly or the
disabled, although far more costly, is far less threatening. KATZ, supra note 12, at 231; SOCIAL SECURITY
BULLETIN, supra note 118, at 101-102. Opinion polls routinely show support for social security: in 1983,
only 8% of those surveyed thought Social Security benefits were too high; in 1984,88% supported maintaining
cost-of-living increases for Social Security. Gallup Poll, Oct. 1984, available in DIALOG, File No. 468;
ABC News/Washington Post Poll, Jan. 1983, available in DIALOG, File No. 468.
151. Many of the current behavior modification proposals are specifically linked with and lobbied for
by conservative think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation. E.g., Robert Rector, Strategies for Welfare
Reform, testimony before the Domestic Task Force of the Select Committee on Hunger, U.S. House of
Representatives, Apr. 9, 1992, reprinted in 378 THE HERITAGE LECTURES, at 10.
152. The AFDC cuts that are publicly supported are those that address behavioral modification and
values. See supra note 141. The same poll that showed support for Learnfare and Family Cap indicated
opposition to direct cuts in AFDC grants. Kershner, supra note 141, at AI. See 1992 Yankelovich Clancy
Shulman Poll, May 15, 1992, available in DIALOG, File No. 468 (showing 75% of respondents oppose
cutting amount of money given to people on welfare); see also COOK ET AL, supra note 87, at (Table 3-1)
(84.5% of respondents state AFDC should be maintained or increased). Polls consistently show support for
helping the "needy" and "assistance to the poor." BLOCK ET AL., supra note 143, at 46-47; 1991 National
Opinion Research Center Poll, Sept. 1991, available in DIALOG, File No. 468. In fact, it has been suggested
that in some cases the behavioral modification proposals are merely a smoke screen to divert attention from
the more significant cuts in AFDC grant levels. FEB. CLASP UPDATE, supra note 117, at 8.
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In the current variation of "otherness," the average citizen considers all
AFDC recipients as part of the "underclass,4 53 i.e., African-American, long-
term welfare recipients who live in inner-city ghettos and regularly have
babies.'54 The stereotype also holds that unlike whites, these undeserving poor
have warped values,155 which do not include the desire for such things as good
schools, jobs, or safe streets.15 6 The Los Angeles riots confirmed the deep
belief of white Americans that the underclass of color is not only permanent,
but determined to undermine white, middle-class ways of life. 57 Consequently,
the current "welfare reform" proposals are designed to "re-exclude" these
"undeserving" poor, until they modify their behavior and prove they are worthy
of our largesse.
58
The New Right's success in drawing support from working and middle class
whites indicates the depth and pervasiveness of the myth of deviance regarding
the AFDC African-American underclass. 5 9 By exploiting a stereotype based
on race and demerit, the New Right encourages the average white citizen to
distance herself or himself from the African-American welfare mother and her
children. 60 While a white may support income transfer programs for the
elderly because she or he anticipates growing old someday,1 6' whites know
that they will never be African American, fourteen years old and pregnant. They
153. Given the well-documented crisis of some urban poverty communities, CHRISTOPHER JENCKS,
RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY (1992); THE URBAN UNDERCLASS (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds.,
1991), a comprehensive targeted policy that addresses the serious problems facing the population encompassed
in the term "underclass" is essential. However, these communities are not comprised primarily of AFDC
recipients. Rather, a major group with critical needs is African-American male youth, not AFDC recipients.
William Julius Wilson & Kathryn M. Neckerman, Poverty and Family Structure: The Widening Gap between
Evidence and Public Policy Issues, in FIGHTING POVERTY, WHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOESN'T 232,252-56
(Sheldon H. Danziger & Daniel H. Weinberg eds., 1986). It is ludicrous to articulate AFDC behavioral
modification eligibility changes as a means of fixing these problems. See MARMOR Er AL., supra note 76,
at 119-24 (discussing how Family Support Act would not substantially affect conditions of underclass).
154. RUTH SIDEL, WOMEN AND CHILDREN LAST: THE PLIGHT OF POOR WOMEN IN AFFLUENT AMERICA
11 (1986).
155. A 1990 study showed that 62% of whites thought African Americans tended to be lazy, while
54% thought Hispanics likely to be lazy. Seventy-eight percent thought African Americans and 72% thought
Hispanics preferred to live off welfare. TOM V. SMITH, NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CENTER, UNIVERSITY
OF CHICAGO, ETHNIC IMAGES 9 (1990).
156. The historical underpinnings and fallacy of the association of the African American with a"culture
of poverty" are comprehensively examined in JACQUELINE JONES, THE DISPOSSESSED (1992).
157. See generally ANDREW HACKER, TWO NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL
187-88 (suggesting that whites regard crimes committed by African Americans as forms of resistance and
retribution).
158. See Handler, supra note 13, at 460.
159. See id. at 523 (arguing that certain welfare reformers create images of the "unworthy" African-
American welfare dependent to impose harsh, stigmatizing welfare programs); see also Hearings, supra
note 5 1, at 49 (statement of Thomas J. Corbett, Associate Scientist, Institute for Research on Poverty) (arguing
that powerful images of underclass are pushing welfare reform back into "changing people").
160. See generally MARMOR Er AL, supra note 76, at7 (discussing how American social myth of rugged
individualism creates negative attitude toward welfare dependency).
161. The rhetoric of helplessness as to how to solve the poverty of women and children, see Ross, supra
note 81, at 1509-10, is not present in our discussions regarding the elderly, among whom we have substantially
reduced the poverty rate through income transfer programs. JONES, supra note 156, at 272; PHILLIPS, supra
note 146, at 203-07.
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can freely discount poverty as the moral failing of urban African-American
culture, rather than recognizing it as a social condition cutting across racial and
geographic lines and entrapping even the morally virtuous. The myth enables
whites to nourish their deeply held belief that they will never be poor because
they work hard, keep their kids in school, and make rational family planning
decisions. 62
Contrary to the myth, empirical data does not support the stereotype of
welfare recipients as African Americans living in urban ghettos. Only 39.7%
of all AFDC recipients in 1990 were African American. 6 3 Non-Hispanic whites
comprised 38.1% of AFDC recipients in 1990. The percentage of African-
American recipients has in fact decreased from 45.8% since 19 73 .164 Moreover,
only 8.9% of the total poor live in "ghettos."165 The median stay on AFDC
in 1990 was twenty-three months.166 Under any of the prevailing definitions,
the urban "underclass" is but a small percentage of the AFDC population. 67
Nevertheless, by focusing on images of the underclass welfare mother, the
New Right has reduced the entire poverty debate to the AFDC program. The
New Right advocates have transformed the increase of minorities on AFDC rolls
in the 1960's and 1970's into a racially dependent definition of poverty.1
68
The New Right inflames outrage at the lack of individual responsibility in the
African-American community, thus making it acceptable to express blatantly
racist concepts without fear or shame.
169
The New Right has played not only to racial fears and prejudice, but also
to the dream of intact families and the fantasy of women as moral guardians.
170
162. See Ross, supra note 81, at 1500-01.
163. 1992 GREEN BOOK, supra note 42, at 670. In Wisconsin, 48% of families in which a teen was
subject to Learnfare were headed by a white parent and 34% were headed by an African-American parent.
QUINN Er AL., supra note 51, at 9.
164. 1992 GREEN BOOK, supra note 42, at 670.
165. THE URBAN UNDERCLASS, supra note 153, at 251 (defining "ghetto" as metropolitan census tract
having poverty rate above 40%).
166. 1992 GREEN BOOK, supra note 42, at 670.
167. See KEN AULETTA, THE UNDERCLASS xvi (1982) (describing "underclass" as connected with
behavioral and moral deficiencies). The exact parameters and size of this subpopulation vary widely. Ricketts
and Sawhill summarize selected studies on the underclass which use different definitions of the term
"underclass." The study with the broadest definition (people poor at least five years between 1967 and 1973)
found the underclass to make up 5.3% of the U.S. population. A 1979 study using the more generally accepted
definition of the underclass, encompassing all people living in census tracts with poverty rates above 40%,
estimated the underclass at only 0.8% of the U.S. population. Long-term AFDC recipients living in poverty
areas comprised only 2.9% of the U.S. poverty population and 0.4% of the U.S. population. Erol R. Ricketts
& Isabel V. Sawhill, Defining and Measuring the Underclass, 7 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 316, 319
(1988).
168. See, e.g., MURRAY, supra note 5, at 54 ("The customary-indeed, virtually the only
practicable-way to deal with this problem is by using a racial breakdown, namely by comparing the trendline
among blacks with the trendline among whites.").
169. See, e.g., Handier, supra note 13, at 460.
170. See, e.g., GILDER, supra note 5, at 70-71; ROTHMAN, supra note 32, at 26. Also key to the New
Right's embracing of behavior modification welfare proposals is its philosophical opposition to all government
programs for the poor, perceived as contrary to pro-family, anti-divorce values. GILDER, supra note 5, at
117; MURRAY, supra note 5, at 277-78; "[Marriage is probably the best anti-poverty program of all." Dan
Quayle, Murphy Brown and the Media Elite: Moral Poverty, CRISIS, July/Aug. 1992, at 45. "Indeed, after
1992] Welfare Reform Proposals
In the New Right mythology, single mothers, particularly those not economically
"independent," are necessarily sexually overactive and morally deviant. 171 This
gender bias, like racial stereotyping, is not new to the welfare debate. Our social
welfare policy has always preferred white women who were related to a man
in the labor market or were in the workforce themselves.
172
The demographics of the labor market, however, have changed. Since the
early 1970's, as real wages fell and as buying power declined, women have
entered the workplace in unprecedented numbers.173 They went to work outside
the home not only because the women's movement opened some previously
closed doors, but also because of the belief that two incomes were necessary
to maintain a desired lifestyle. 74
A growing number of women now would prefer not to work, but feel trapped
by perceived economic circumstances. 75 Social expectations about women
as domestic caretakers have not adjusted to the realities of working women.
Women are still expected to do the bulk of the child care, home care, and
nurturing, and they are often overwhelmed by the substantial and conflicting
demands on their time.176
work the second principle of upward mobility is the maintenance of monogamous marriage and family."
GILDER, supra note 5, at 69.
171. See THE INSTITUTE FOR CULTURAL CONSERVATISM, CULTURAL CONSERVATISM: TOWARD A NEW
NATIONAL AGENDA 83 (1987) (discussing "culture of instant sensual gratification"); Martha Albertson
Fineman, lntimacy Outside The Natural Family: The Limits Of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 955,958 (1991).
But it is still the male model of being tied to the labor market that creates one's lack of"dependency." Fathers
who "depend" on women's unpaid labor to raise children and care for the home are not "dependent." Few
would stigmatize at-home wives as "dependent' on their husbands, since the family unit is intact and a
working role model is in the home. See ELLWOOD, supra note 38, at 135. Moreover, a woman with children
whose benefits derive from a deceased or disabled man's Social Security earnings record is not considered
"dependent," although in every other respect she may look identical to the AFDC mother. HACKER, supra
note 157, at 91-92.
172. See Martha L. Fineman, Images Of Mothers In Poverty Discourses, 1991 DUKE L. J. 274,280-81
(1991); Handler, supra note 13, at 487, 522.
173. The number of women working outside the home increased 88% between 1964 and 1989: from
32,441,000 to 61,116,000. WORKERS WITH Low EARNINGS, supra note 146, at 1. Of women with children
under the age of six, 64% worked at some time during the year, although only 25% worked full-time year-
round. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MOTHER-ONLY FAMILIES: Low EARNINGS WILL KEEP MANY
CHILDREN IN POVERTY 4 (1991).
174. See BARBARA R. BERGMANN, THE ECONOMIC EMERGENCE OF WOMEN 29-34 (1986); ELLWOOD,
supra note 38, at 65. While in 1980, only 19% of women working outside the home said employment was
necessary to support their families and 43% said they worked to earn "extra" money, in 1990, 31% said
they worked to support their families and only 32% said they worked to bring home extra money. Tense
Times for Families, THE PUBLIC PULSE (Roper Org., Inc.), Jan. 1991 [hereinafter Tense Times].
175. A 1990 poll found that 43% of women aged 21-29 would give up work indefinitely if they could
afford the income loss. This is an increase of 9% since 1989. Helaine Olen, Boomer Backlash: Women Say
They'll Put Family First, LA. TIMES, June 12, 199 1, at El (citing 1990 Yankelovich Clancy Shulman poll).
A second 1990 poll found that since 1985 the number of all women who would rather be homemakers than
employed outside the home had risen from 45% to 51%. "This marks a stunning reversal from the previous
decade when the number of women preferring work outside of the home grew from 35% in 1975 to 51%
in 1985, and the number wanting to stay at home dropped from 60% to 45%." Tense Times, supra note
174 (citing Virginia Slims Poll). See also George H. Gallup, Jr. & Frank Newport, Virtually All Adults Want
Children, but ManyReasonsAre Intangible, GALLUP POLL MONTHLY, June 1990, at22 (finding that if money
were not issue, half of all working mothers would stay home).
176. In a 1990 poll, 66% of mothers said that the conflicting demands of family and work "put them
The Yale Law Journal
The New Right's ideology of division channels that dissatisfaction toward
welfare mothers: why should a woman who wants to be a homemaker have to
work outside of the home and support through her tax dollars the AFDC recipient
who has the "luxury" of staying at home to raise her children? 177 This senti-
ment has prompted behavioral modification proposals like Learnfare and Family
Cap, which seek to punish and devalue the "nonproductive" mother for the
ostensible reason that she at least should exercise some control over her children
and stop getting pregnant.
This attempt to use economic motivation to create changed behavior in
AFDC mothers and children leads to "solutions" that are contrary to empirical
evidence and thus cannot solve the problems for which they are ostensibly
designed. "Welfare reform" programs such as Learnfare and Family Cap do not
solve burgeoning social problems; they reflect only political expedience and
culturally biased mythology.
under a lot of stress.' Tense Times, supra note 174.
177. See 133 CONG. REC. H11,515-16 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1987) (remarks of Rep. Roukema) (opposing
Family Support Act). In 1972, 49% of adults surveyed believed that mothers receiving welfare should be
required to take any job offered them. Gallup Poll, May 1972, available in DIALOG, File No. 468. In 1991,
79% favored requiring all mothers on welfare to do work for their welfare checks. Gallup Poll, November,
1991, available in DIALOG, File No. 468. By 1992, 80% favored such a requirement. Gallup Poll, April
1992, available in DIALOG, File No. 468. The stereotype of the perennially unemployed mother again uses
only a subset of the AFDC population as a symbol of the unworthy poor. Thirty-nine percent of single AFDC
mothers in a recent study either combined work with welfare, or alternated between them during a two-year
period. The race of the mother was not a predictor of whether the mother would go into the labor market.
INSTITUTE FOR WOMEN'S POLICY RESEARCH, COMBINING WORK AND WELFARE: AN ALTERNATIVE ANTI-
POVERTY STRATEGY 9-19 (1992).
It is not surprising that at the same time that policymakers are trying to use the minuscule AFDC budget
to address major systemic problems of poverty, states are not spending even the money already appropriated
under the Family Support Act to implement job programs designed to move AFDC mothers into the labor
force. JAN L. HAGEN & IRENE LURIE, THE NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT, STATE
UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, IMPLEMENTING JOBS: INITIAL STATE CHOICES, SUMMARY REPORT 6 (1992).
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